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ABSTRACT
Wisdom of crowds refers to the phenomenon that the ag-
gregate prediction or forecast of a group of individuals
can be surprisingly more accurate than most individuals
in the group, and sometimes – than any of the individuals
comprising it. This article models the impact of social
influence on the wisdom of crowds. We build a minimal-
istic representation of individuals as Brownian particles
coupled by means of social influence. We demonstrate
that the model can reproduce results of a previous em-
pirical study. This allows us to draw more fundamental
conclusions about the role of social influence: In particu-
lar, we show that the question of whether social influence
has a positive or negative net effect on the wisdom of
crowds is ill-defined. Instead, it is the starting config-
uration of the population, in terms of its diversity and
accuracy, that directly determines how beneficial social
influence actually is. The article further examines the
scenarios under which social influence promotes or im-
pairs the wisdom of crowds.
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular belief, the wisdom of crowds1 is a
statistical and not a psychological phenomenon. Wis-
dom, in this context, refers to the aggregate opinion of
a population being closer to a true value than most in-
dividual opinions. The idea of aggregating over a space
of opinions can, in an ergodic fashion, also be applied to
aggregating over an individual’s own perspectives over
time, with the same benefits – i.e. it may yield a more
accurate decision making (Rauhut & Lorenz 2011).
However, the wisdom of crowds is not a pure statisti-
cal regularity, in the sense that more does not imply
better. It necessitates certain conditions, which can be
summarised, following (Surowiecki 2005), as diversity
and independence of opinions, specialisation in expert
knowledge and a mechanism for aggregating individual
opinions. From this perspective, the best collective deci-
sions do not rely on consensus building and compromises,
but instead on aggregating many heterogeneous views –
given enough diversity in opinions, the errors in each
of them cancel out until only useful information is left
(Surowiecki 2005, p.10).
1The terms crowd and group are used interchangeably, as are
opinions ↔ estimates ↔ judgements ↔ beliefs and configu-
ration ↔ state.
Diversity has been identified as instrumental in provid-
ing creative perspectives to problem-solving, thus avoid-
ing getting stuck in locally suboptimal solutions (Hong
& Page 2004). In fact, the “diversity prediction theo-
rem”2 (Page 2007) shows that diversity weighs as much
as individual ability in determining collective accuracy.
From a mathematical point of view, diversity is required
in order to balance out uncorrelated imperfections in
opinions through aggregation. Intuitively, as no single
individual is aware of all traits of a given problem at
hand, diversity helps people combine their idiosyncratic
perceptions so that together they gain a wider perspec-
tive. Diversity, however, is not the pinnacle of optimal
decision-making. No amount of diversity can help if the
population is completely ignorant on a given issue, or
if opinions are diverse, but heavily skewed. Thus, the
composition of diversity is as important as diversity itself
(Bonabeau 2009).
Independence of opinions is another important distin-
guishing feature of the wisdom of crowds for it either
excludes communication, information spreading, learn-
ing and social influence processes, such as herding and
imitation or limits the effect of such processes should
they be present. In this context, it is useful to draw a
conceptual difference between wisdom of crowds, as com-
monly understood, and “collective intelligence”. Wis-
dom of crowds is a quantification of the state currently
occupied by a given group, such as an aggregate opin-
ion. Intelligence, pertains to the ability of individuals to
learn, to understand, and to adapt to arbitrary exter-
nal conditions using own knowledge (Leimeister 2010).
Collective, describes a group of individuals pooling their
intelligence together for a common purpose. As such,
collective intelligence can be seen as the mechanism by
which groups converge to a certain collective decision,
whereas wisdom of crowds is the numerical representa-
tion of the said decision. In this paper, we are interested
in how the collective intelligence mechanism affects the
wisdom of crowds.
Recent empirical evidence has shown that enabling col-
lective intelligence by introducing social influence, can be
detrimental to the aggregate performance3 of a popula-
tion (Lorenz et al. 2011). By social influence, we under-
2The theorem states that collective accuracy equals average
individual error minus the variance in opinions, i.e. group
diversity.
3Performance is the pair {E(t),W(t)}. See next section.
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stand the pervasive tendency of individuals to conform to
the behaviour and expectations of others (Kahan 1997).
In separate experiments, Lorenz et al. asked partici-
pants to re-evaluate their opinions on quantitative sub-
jects over several rounds and under three information
spreading scenarios – no information about others’ es-
timations (control group), the average of all opinions
in each round and full information on other subjects’
judgements. They found evidence that under the latter
two regimes, the diversity in the population decreased,
while the collective deviation from the truth increased.
This result justified the disheartening conclusion that
allowing people to learn about others’ behaviours and
adapt their own as a response does not always lead to the
group acting “wiser”4. Rather, as the authors posited,
not only is the population jointly convinced of a wrong
result, but even the simple aggregation technique of the
wisdom of crowds is deteriorated. From a policy-maker’s
perspective, such groups are, thus, not wise.
Current research has not yet investigated thoroughly the
theoretical link between social influence and its effect on
the wisdom of crowds. In this paper, we build upon the
empirical study in (Lorenz et al. 2011) by developing a
formal model of social influence. Our goal is to unveil
whether the effects of social influence are uncondition-
ally positive or negative, or whether its ultimate role is
mediated through some mechanism, so that the effect on
the group wisdom is only indirect. We adopt a minimal-
istic agent-based model, which successfully reproduces
the findings of the said study and gives enough insight
to draw more general conclusions. In particular, we con-
firm that small amounts of social influence lead to faster
convergence, however, it is the starting configuration5
of the population (in terms of its initial diversity and
deviation from the truth) that ultimately attribute the
net effect of social influence on the wisdom of crowds.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next
section reviews the empirical study on which our model
is based, together with its main results and the measures
used to quantify the collective performance of the groups.
The model itself is presented after that. Results and
conclusions follow as the last two sections respectively.
THE EXPERIMENT
One of the latest study of the effect of social influence
on wisdom of crowds aimed at quantifying how people’s
opinions are influenced by others and to what extent this
influence relates to the aggregate deviation of the group
from an objective truth (Lorenz et al. 2011).
The authors recruited 144 subjects among students at
ETH Zu¨rich. The subjects were split into 12 experimen-
tal sessions, each consisting of 12 participants. During
each session the subjects were asked a total of 6 quanti-
tative questions regarding geographical facts and crime
4Wiser, in the numerical sense of the wisdom of crowds.
5Configuration is the pair {E(t),D(t)}. See next section.
statistics6. Each question had to be answered over five
time periods. The questions were designed in such a
way that individuals were not likely to know the exact
answer, but could still formulate educated guesses.
Figure 1 shows the structure of the experiment.
One session (12 Subjects)
full
2 Questions
5 periods
aggregate
2 Questions
5 periods
no
2 Questions
5 periods
Figure 1. Experiment structure
In the first time period, all subjects responded to the par-
ticular question on their own. After all 12 subjects gave
their estimations, each had to answer the same question
over 4 additional periods for a total of 5 rounds. Three
different information conditions were tested regarding
the information that participants learnt about the an-
swers of others in the previous time periods. In the “no”
information regime, no individual was aware of others’
opinions throughout all 5 periods. In the “aggregate”
regime, each subjects was provided with the arithmetic
average of everyone else’s answers in the previous round.
Finally, in the “full” information regime, subjects learnt
all opinions from all previous rounds so far. In each
session, two questions were posed in the no, two in the
aggregated, and two in the full information condition.
The 12 subjects were randomly assigned to the three
information conditions in the beginning of the session.
An important component of the experiment was the re-
ward structure. Participants received individual awards
depending on their deviations from the correct answer
– reward-bearing deviations were defined as 10%, 20%
and 40% intervals around the truth. The rewards were
provided at each round, so that individuals were moti-
vated to make optimal decisions at all times. However,
the correct answer and rewards were disclosed at the end
of the experiment to avoid giving away a-priori knowl-
edge about the truth. This reward structure eliminated
the benefits of strategic considerations, such as mislead-
ing or cooperating with others, because it did not affect
individuals’ payments – subjects had incentives to use
only their own knowledge and interpretation of others’
opinions to find the truth.
As we mentioned above, a requirement for quantify-
ing the wisdom of crowds is a suitable aggregation
measure. Ideally, an aggregated measure would indi-
cate the most central opinion in the population. For
6Example: What is the population density of Switzerland?
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opinion distributions that are Gaussian-like, the simple
unweighted arithmetic average may be a good choice.
There are other averaging methods, which could per-
form better in special cases (Genest & Zidek 1986, Dawid
et al. 1995, Hegselmann & Krause 2005). The opinion
distributions in the experiment were found to be heav-
ily right-skewed with a majority of low estimates and a
minority spread on a fat right tail, much like log-normal
distributions. The skew made the arithmetic average
inappropriate as a measure of centrality, since it was
closer to the truth than individuals’ first estimates in
only 21.3% of the cases. However, taking the natural log-
arithm of the estimates, resulted in a more bell-shaped
distribution. Consequently, the arithmetic average of the
log-transformed opinions (which equals the logarithm of
the geometric mean of the original data) performed much
better – it was closer to the true value than individu-
als’ first estimates in 77.1% of the cases. This provided
a justification for log-transforming all opinions over all
sessions before further analysis7.
Three main quantities were used to evaluate the ag-
gregate performance of the crowd – “collective error”,
“group diversity” and “wisdom of crowds indicator”. Let
N be the number of individuals and xi(t) be the answer
of individual i in round t. The collective error, E(t), is
defined as the squared deviation of the average opinion
in round t from the true value, T . Since all xi’s were log-
transformed, the arithmetic average is 〈lnx(t)〉8, which
equals the logarithm of the geometric mean of the origi-
nal data, thus the collective error in period t equals:
E(t) = (ln T − 〈lnx(t)〉)2 (1)
The group diversity in period t, D(t), is the variance of
the opinion distribution:
D(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(lnxi(t)− 〈lnx(t)〉)2 (2)
Finally, the wisdom of crowds indicator, W(t), measures
how much deviation from the most central estimate is
needed to encompass, or bracket, the true value. More
precisely, W(t) = max{i|xˆi(t) ≤ T ≤ xˆN−i+1(t)}, where
xˆi’s are the original (i.e. not log-transformed) sorted
opinions. The indicator has a maximum of N/2 when
the truth lies between the most central estimates (or is
the most central estimate) and a minimum of zero when
the truth is outside the range of all estimates.
The experiment demonstrated that even trace amount
of social influence, in terms of knowledge about others’
opinions, has a negative effect on the wisdom of crowds.
This is manifested via three effects: “Social influence”,
“Range reduction” and “Self-confidence” effect. The
first leads to convergence of opinions, i.e., reduction of
group diversity, without improving the collective error
7The authors in fact took the logarithm of the original es-
timates divided by the true values, so that answers across
different questions could be compared
8The notation 〈X〉 stands for (1/N)∑Ni=1Xi
significantly. Range reduction reveals that the core range
of estimates needed to enclose the true value gradually
increases (i.e. the wisdom of crowds indicator decreases,
meaning that the true value becomes less central in the
distribution of opinions), while at the same time the
distribution becomes narrower due to the social influ-
ence effect. As a result, the crowd slowly converges to
a wrong value. Finally, the self-confidence effect demon-
strates that individuals become increasingly confident in
their opinions, whereas concurrently the group converges
away from the truth. The authors concluded that so-
cial influence undermines the wisdom of crowds, as the
population collectively drifts away from the truth with
increasing confidence.
The agent-based model introduced below reproduces the
social influence and range reduction effects in an artifi-
cial population under the no- and aggregate-information
scenarios and, based on this framework, we will show
that the decline of crowd wisdom cannot be imputed to
social influence alone.
THE MODEL
Consider a population of N individuals, each possess-
ing a continuous opinion xi(t) at time t. We posit that
the opinion of agent i evolves according to the following
process:
d
dt
xi(t) = αi (〈x(t)〉 − xi(t)) +βi (xi(0)− xi(t)) +Dξi(t)
(3)
The first term represents coupling to an individual’s en-
vironment. We refer to it as “social influence”. In the
aggregate regime, people are only aware of the arithmetic
average of all opinions, so they try to converge to that
value with a given sensitivity αi: it corresponds to the
perceived strength of social influence affecting the i–th
individual.
The second term models individual’s tendency to uphold
their original opinions. We refer to it as “individual con-
viction”, and its strength is given by the parameter βi.
The third term corresponds to the fact that individu-
als may change their opinion because they incorporate
other information (known ex ante), they previously dis-
regarded. This term does not come from interactions,
but originates purely from internal mechanisms. Then,
ξi(t) is Gaussian white noise with unit variance. D is
the corresponding noise intensity.
From a physicist’s point of view, this dynamics resembles
Brownian particles interacting in a mean-field scenario
(Schweitzer Frank 2007). In social psychology, we can
also see Eq. (3) as a formalisation of Lewin’s heuristics
that the individual action is a function of idiosyncratic
perception of available information and the influence
of a “field”, that is the influence of their environment
(Sansone et al. 2004).
With these basic ingredients set-up, we investigate nu-
merically the evolution of the collective error, E , group
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diversity, D, and the wisdom of crowds indicator, W,
as it depends on the {α, β} parameter space. In the
simplest case, we take αi = α and βi = β.
RESULTS
For all simulations, we used the Heun/Euler method
with a constant time-step ∆t = 0.01:
xi(t+ ∆t) = xi(t) + ∆tα(〈x(t)〉 − xi(t))+
+ ∆tβ(xi(0)− xi(t)) +D
√
∆t GRND
GRND is a Gaussian random number whose mean equals
0 and standard its deviation is one. The noise intensity,
D = 10−3.
To test dependence on the initial configuration, two
different starting populations were sampled from log-
normal distributions with means, µ1 = −3 , µ2 = −2.9,
and variances, σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0.72
9. A noise intensity of
0.001 for the stochastic term, thus, ensures that the im-
pact of the noise is small, yet present.
Each simulation was run for N = 100 agents and T =
3000 time steps. The latter ensures that the population
eventually reaches a steady-state, where dxi(t)/dt = 0.
The equilibrium is attained when the perceived social
influence driving an individual’s opinion away from its
initial value equals the strength of individual conviction
trying to keep the individual at its original estimate.
No-information Regime
The no-information regime is recovered by setting α = 0.
Eq. (3) then becomes:
d
dt
xi(t) = β (xi(0)− xi(t)) +Dξ(t) (4)
This is a standard Orstein-Uhlenbeck process, whose so-
lution is formally given by:
xi(t) = xi(0)e
−βt+xi(0)
(
1− e−βt)+D ∫ t
0
eβ(s−t)ξi(s)ds
Therefore the time average of the individual estimates,
xi(t), drifts towards xi(0) for large t.
As there is no social influence in this regime, agents do
not have incentives to deviate from their original opin-
ions nor information on which to base such deviations,
up to small random fluctuations. In this sense, the pop-
ulation can be considered static (Figure 2).
In Figure 2, a simulation of two populations with
{E1(0) = 0.01,D1(0) = 0.72} and {E2(0) = 0.018,D2(0) =
0.72} demonstrates that in the long-term neither group
significantly deviates from its initial accuracy and het-
erogeneity. Note that the actual value of the truth, ln T ,
is irrelevant, since of interest is only the initial “correct-
ness” of the crowd, E(0).
9µ and σ2 refer to arithmetic average and variance of the
log-transformed estimates respectively.
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Figure 2. Simulation of Eq. (4). The aggregate measures,
E and D, fluctuate around their starting values. Left:
E(0) = 0.018 (dashed), E(0) = 0.01 (solid). Right: D(0) =
0.72. Simulation parameters: D = 10−3.
Analogous result is obtained for the long-term value of
W.
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Figure 3. The Wisdom of Crowds indicator for the two
populations from Figure 2 (same line styles). Long term
behaviour is random fluctuations around W1(0) = 46 (solid
line) and W2(0) = 42 (dashed line). Simulation parame-
ters: D = 10−3.
We conclude that in the absence of information other
than one’s own judgement, groups do not tend to deviate
significantly from their original state, i.e. the wisdom of
crowds is constant.
Aggregate Information Regime
In the aggregate information regime agents observe the
average of all estimates, which is equivalent to a mean-
field scenario. Averaging Eq. (3) over the whole popula-
tion yields:
d 〈x(t)〉
dt
= β (〈x(0)〉 − 〈x(t)〉) + D√
N
〈ξ(t)〉
which is again an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, with so-
lution:
〈x(t)〉 = 〈x(0)〉 e−βt + 〈x(0)〉 (1− e−βt)+
+
D√
N
∫ t
0
eβ(s−t) 〈ξ(s)〉 ds (5)
hence, the arithmetic average is approximately constant
with fluctuations around its starting value, 〈x(0)〉.
Contrary to the no-information case, allowing for social
interactions can lead the group to different end states,
depending on the strengths of social influence and indi-
vidual conviction. A parameter sweep in α and β reveals
the complete picture.
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Figure 4. Ambiguous effect of social influence on the
collective error (E). Top-left: E(0) = 0.8, ln T = −2,
〈lnx(t)〉 = −2.9. Top-right: E(0) = 0.02, ln T = −3.14,
〈lnx(t)〉 = −3. Bottom-left: E(0) = 0.01, ln T = −2.9,
〈lnx(t)〉 = −3. The group diversity for the previous three
cases is the same and shown in the bottom-right, with
D(0) = 0.72. Black contour lines indicate regions where
the collective error equals its starting value. Simulation
parameters: D = 10−3.
In Figure 4 we have displayed the long-term collective er-
rors (top-left, top-right, bottom-left) and group diversity
(bottom-right) for three different starting configurations.
The group diversity behaves almost the same for all three
cases, hence we have shown it for the top-left population.
Not surprisingly, agents tend to conglomerate around a
common opinion in the presence of social influence (Fig-
ure 4, bottom-right), regardless of the starting configu-
ration. We note also that individual conviction acts in
the opposite way – it maintains diversity in the group
by reducing the perceived strength of social influence.
Figure 4 also illustrates the opposing effects between
social influence and individual conviction – the colour
transition from blue to red regions and vice versa. This
struggle is present in all starting configurations, however,
its polarity is equivocal. In the top-left plot, stronger in-
dividual conviction is in the group’s detriment, for the
long-term collective error increases with β for any fixed
α. Individual conviction is beneficial in all other cases
– the net effect is dependent on the initial state of the
population.
Further, we note that the collective error grows if
〈lnx(0)〉 > ln(T ), as shown in the top-right. The reason
is that the geometric mean strictly increases when xi(t)
is driven by Eq. 310. Figure 5 provides an intuition for
this claim.
The top-right case in Figure 4 essentially represents a
scenario where social influence not only does not improve
the aggregate performance of the population, but can
10Thus lnx(t) = ln GM always increases with time. This re-
sult can be derived analytically.
Figure 5. Rightward motion of the geometric mean (GM).
The geometric mean equals the median (i.e. the 50th
percentile) for log-normal distributions. However, since
agents are coupled to the arithmetic mean (AM) and AM
is greater than GM, at any given time there will be more
mass moving to the right (negative-sloped stripes) than
to the left (positive-sloped stripes). As a result the GM
will strictly increase until agents reach equilibrium.
significantly increase its inaccuracy, reducing the group
diversity at the same time.
Similar fate awaits the group even if 〈lnx(0)〉 < ln(T ),
albeit for reduced parameter range. In the bottom-left
scenario, the aggregate opinion of the population starts
from a relatively accurate state, and ends up with a
larger long-term collective error for values of (α, β) to the
right of the second 0.01 contour line. In effect, these two
configurations reproduce the negative effect that social
influence has been shown to have in empirical studies.
In particular, Lorenz et al. describe their “social influ-
ence effect” as diminishing diversity in groups without
improving their accuracy, which is precisely our finding
here. Therefore, despite the opposing effect of individual
conviction, for any non-zero strength of social influence,
the population ends up at a worse long-term state than
the one it started from.
Interestingly, other configurations exist where social in-
fluence brings a clear advantage. Consider the relatively
inaccurate initial population in the top-left. Virtually
for the whole parameter range, the end collective error
is lower than that in the beginning. Even more, with the
weakest individual conviction and strongest social influ-
ence, the agents actually converge to the most accurate
long-term state.
Such a positive outcome is also achieved in the bottom-
left plot. Up to a certain limit, increasing the social in-
fluence leads the population to better stationary states11
(dark blue regions), while decreasing the diversity at the
same time. Considering these cases now, one can rightly
conclude the opposite – social influence is beneficial to
the average accuracy of crowds.
Turning our attention now to the wisdom of crowds in-
dicator, W, we plot its long-term behaviour for the two
of the three starting configurations in Figure 4.
The population in the left plot is the same as in Figure
4, top-right. Naturally, as the long-term collective error
always increases with social influence, the distribution
of estimates moves farther from the true value and gets
11Better in the sense of lower collective error.
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Figure 6. Simulated long-term value of the Wisdom of
Crowds indicator. Left: W(0) = 43, E(0) = 0.02. Right:
W(0) = 46, E = 0.01. Both: 〈lnx(t)〉 = −3, D(0) = 0.72.
Simulation parameters as in Figure 4
more homogeneous at the same time. As a result, the
range of estimates needed to bracket the truth strictly
increases, which explains why W ends up always lower
than in the beginning. Moreover, the strength of social
influence accelerates the said drift of this group, and in
turn decreases further the long-term W (blue region).
The same behaviour can be observed in the right plot of
Figure 6 (right-half of plot only), which is the configura-
tion from Figure 4, bottom-left – social influence leads
the group away from the truth and decreases its wisdom,
as measured by W. In effect, what we have described
above is the “range reduction effect” found in (Lorenz
et al. 2011) – the truth is displaced to peripheral regions
of the opinion distribution and the group becomes nar-
rowly centred around a wrong value. As a consequence,
a social planner who takes a unique advise, represented
by the aggregate opinion of the group, is likely to be
misled.
As with the collective error, we find that social influence
can also be beneficial for the wisdom of crowds indicator.
In Figure 6, right, W, actually grows with the strength
of the social interactions, and achieves the maximum
value of N/2 (darkest red region). So, despite the loss of
heterogeneity in estimates, due to the favourable initial
conditions the long-term aggregate opinion of the group
ends up closer to the true value (i.e. the collective error
decreases) for moderate amounts of social influence. As
a result the distribution of opinions is narrowly centred
around the truth – the crowd is “wiser”.
Explaining these ambiguous effects of social influence on
E and W is one of our main results. It is not the case
that social influence is inherently “good” or “bad”, and
that one should attribute group performance directly to
it. Rather its impact is modulated by the starting state
of the group, in terms of E(0) and D(0). Awareness of
the latter could allow us to determine ex-ante whether
stronger social interactions are favourable or not. In ad-
dition, the counter effect of individual conviction could
be used to remedy those populations that started from
an unfavourable state; by implementing measures, which
promote individuals’ self-confidence at the expense of so-
cial influence.
CONCLUSION
This paper set out to study the relationship between the
collective wisdom of a group, and the social influence
among the individuals constituting it. In particular, we
aimed at explaining the ambiguous role of social influ-
ence, which in some circumstances bears a positive ef-
fect on the wisdom of crowds, and in others a negative
one. This is a pressing question as social interactions are
practically ubiquitous – crowds are embedded in social
contexts, which invariably couple the individuals within
them. Democracies assume and rely on extensive public
discussions to form opinions and create policies. Our
behaviour as consumers, investors, voters, etc., is influ-
enced by discussions with, friends, colleagues and experts
(among others). From a policy-maker’s perspective, this
question translates to whether a government can reliably
harness the wisdom of crowds subject to heavy social
influence (Coleman & Blumler 2011). Unravelling the
mechanisms (if any) by which social influence positively
or negatively affects the wisdom of crowds, becomes then
important for evaluating the trustworthiness of crowd
predictions.
In a recent experiment (Lorenz et al. 2011), participants
were given a guessing task, where an objective true value
had to be approached. Each individual updated their
estimate for several rounds based on (i) no information
about others’ judgements, (ii) the average estimation of
the population or (iii) full information about everyone
else’s estimates. The study found that under the last
two scenarios the wisdom of crowds is weakened, which
speaks for the negative effects of social influence.
In this paper, we introduced a simple model that repro-
duces the results of the no- and aggregate-information
scenarios in said study. The model consists of a popula-
tion of agents endowed with a minimum set of cognitive
abilities. The agents continuously revise their estima-
tions, based on individual conviction (their belief in own
estimations) and social influence (from the rest of the
population). We focused on the long-term dynamics of
three indicators measuring the performance of the pop-
ulation: (i) the collective error, (ii) group diversity and
(iii) wisdom of crowds indicator once equilibrium has
been reached.
We have demonstrated that groups whose initial average
opinion is relatively far from the truth in general bene-
fit from stronger social influence. The effect occurs be-
cause the stationary value the aggregated opinion tends
to (i.e. the geometric mean in our case), and the conver-
gence speed to this value, increase with the strength of
social influence, which in turn reduces the collective error
in the long-term. In other words, promoting extended
communication and exchange of views is more likely to
help those crowds that start off relatively wrong.
The effect of social influence, however, is detrimental
to groups with a relatively accurate initial configuration
and thus suffer from an increased drift in the aggregated
opinion. In these cases, the initially small collective error
quickly reduces to zero, but then continues to increase
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even beyond its starting value, due to the persistent
motion of the geometric mean. For such groups, small
to moderate amounts of information exchange are thus
more beneficial.
Finally, other initial conditions exist, where even traces
of social influence leads to deterioration in the long-term
collective error. This is the main finding of (Lorenz et al.
2011), which is referred to as “social influence” effect.
The above discussion applies analogously to the wisdom
of crowds indicator, the quantification of how far the
median estimate of the population is from the truth. We
have found starting configurations which lead groups to
be less wise12 in the long-term, for any amount of social
influence, i.e. the so-called “range reduction” effect from
(Lorenz et al. 2011); and configurations where groups
end up wiser in the presence of moderate social influence.
Based on these observations, our main result is that so-
cial influence in the aggregate-regime does not directly
influence the wisdom of crowds. Rather it is the starting
configuration of the population, in terms of its collective
error and group diversity, which determines the long-
term benefits or harms of social influence. The result
gives insight into how crowds can be driven to different
states by modulating the strength of social influence. For
example, given some intuition about how inaccurate the
crowd initially is, we suggest that a policy-maker may
either promote social influence processes in a population
or increase individual conviction to counter undesired
group influence in order to steer the group prediction
into more optimal long-term states.
It is important to stress that this result is applicable only
when individuals do not possess knowledge about the ob-
jective truth13, nor do they learn or receive information
that can lead them towards it. In other words, there
is no feedback between an agent’s opinion, at any given
time, and their distance from the truth. Consequently,
social influence through coupling to the mean affects rel-
evant system-wide properties (the geometric mean in our
case), but not the collective error or wisdom of crowds
indicator. As a topic for further research, we hypoth-
esise that even using different modelling approaches to
social influence (e.g. model the full-information regime
in (Lorenz et al. 2011) or couple only to those deemed
“experts”), our result qualitatively holds, as long as no
feedback between the objective truth and agents perfor-
mance is present.
The current model assumes the existence of an objec-
tive truth, and ignores learning, which is not the case in
many real-world situations (e.g. financial markets, po-
litical polls, etc.). However, individuals in our model do
no possess perfect knowledge of the truth, and the latter
is only present in the form of the distribution of initial
guesses. Consequently, by definition the collective error
12Wise, in the sense of the wisdom of crowds indicator.
13Except for idiosyncratic knowledge that forms initial opin-
ions.
and the wisdom of crowds indicator are driven solely by
interactions and information dissemination within the
group. The true value is needed ex-post to quantify the
current state of the population. Therefore, our propo-
sition that it is the crowd’s starting configuration that
ultimately determines the effect of social influence can
be generalised to these scenarios as well.
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